Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 92
Number 2 Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume
92, Number 2

Article 16

2013

Otherwise Qualified: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Origin
of the Direct Threat Defense
Patrick D. Flamming

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Flamming, Patrick D. (2013) "Otherwise Qualified: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Origin of the
Direct Threat Defense," Florida Historical Quarterly: Vol. 92: No. 2, Article 16.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/16

Flamming: Otherwise Qualified: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Origi

"Otherwise Qualified": The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Origin of the Direct
Threat Defense
Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, No. 3:82-cv00305:JHM (M.D. Fla. 1983)

by Patrick D. Flemming
n an effort to integrate individuals with disabilities into society
and abate employment discrimination, Congress passed the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act) .1 While the Act more clearly
applied to certain individuals with disabilities, the Act's construction
seemingly left undefined whether individuals with contagious
diseases were afforded the same coverage. The case giving rise to
the Supreme Court's landmark employment law decision resolving
the matter was the unreported, oral opinion of Arline v. School

I

Patrick Flemming received his J.D. from Florida State University College of Law in
2012 and a B.S. in Finance from Florida State University in 2009. The author thanks
the Historical Society of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for providing the opportunity to write this Comment and his loving family
for their support.
1
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U .S.C. §§ 701-796 (2006)). While the Act historically used
the term handicap, Congress amended the Act in 1992 to replace the term
with disability, the "preferred terminology of persons protected by the Act."
Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Impl.ementing the ADAs Direct Threat Defense,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1279, 1280 n.10 (2001); Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992). In this Comment, the
term handicap has been replaced with disability except for its usage in quoted
material and references to statutory definitions.
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Board of Nassau County,2 which was decided in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. This Comment
examines the district court's opinion, comparing the holding to
similar decisions interpreting the Act, and illuminates how Arline
resulted in the Supreme Court articulating the transformative
"direct threat" defense test, which was adopted by Congress and
codified in both the Rehabilitation Act3 and its counterpart, the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 4
After thirteen years of service as an elementary school
teacher, Gene Arline was fired from her position upon suffering
her third relapse of tuberculosis in a two-year span. 5 The School
Board of Nassau County, Florida (School Board), terminated
Arline not "because of any misfeasance, malfeasance, inadequate
performance, or inability to perform the essential functions of
her job"; 6 rather, the School Board fired Arline because of her
"continued reoccurence [sic] of tuberculosis"-fearing that she
would infect others. 7 Arline filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, contending that the School
Board discriminated against her solely on the basis of her disability,
in violation of Section 504 of the Act. 8 Specifically, before the court

2

3
4

5

6
7
8

No. 3:82-cv-00305:JHM (M.D. Fla. 1983). The district court issued an
unreported, oral opinion after a nonjury trial. Therefore, the discussion of
that court's holding and reasoning is derived from Arline's subsequent history
in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, and the district
court's opinion after the Supreme Court's remand. Arline v. Sch. Bd. , 772 F.2d
759, 760 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273 (1986); Arline v. School Bd. , 692
F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 8, 102 Stat. 28, 3132 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (D) (2006)).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2006). Congress recently amended the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the newly amended act also explicitly incorporated the
standards set out by the Supreme Court in Arline. MyLinda K. Sims, When
Pigs Fly: Does the ADA Cover Individuals with Communicable Diseases Such as Novel
NlHl Influenza, "Swine Flu"?, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 463, 469 (2010) (citing ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(b) (3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008)).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 276. Arline had been receiving antituberculosis treatment
since her first relapse in 1977 but tested positive for tuberculosis colonies twice
in 1978. Arline, 692 F. Supp. at 1290.
Arline, 692 F. Supp. at 1290.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 276 (alteration in original).
Arline v. Sch. Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11th Cir. 1985), ajf'd, 480 U.S. 273
(1986); Rehabilitation Act ofl 973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
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were the questions of whether Arline was a "handicapped person
under the terms of the statute" and, if so, whether the School
Board's actions constituted illegal discrimination. 9 Judge Moore
held that Arline was not a "handicapped person" as protected
by the Act, because Congress did not intend to cover individuals
with contagious diseases; and even if she were protected, Judge
Moore added, she was not otherwise qualified for the position. 10
Therefore, he held that the School Board did not violate the Act by
firing Arline solely on the basis of her disability. 11
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Coverage and Exceptions
The Act was the first federal "rights" legislation designed
to protect people with disabilities. 12 Congress designed the Act
to maximize, through the use of federal incentives, the equal
treatment and inclusion of disabled individuals in society, especially
in the field of employment. 13 To effectuate this goal, Congress
included an antidiscrimination provision into the Act, Section 504,
which originally stated that" [n] o otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the

9
10

11
12

13

Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (No. 85-1277).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 277. The Honorable John H. Moore II was appointed to
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida by President Ronald
Reagan in 1981 and served on the bench until his death on July 19, 2013.
Federal Judicial Center, http: / / www.fjc.gov/ servlet/ nGetlnfo?jid=l676&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 277.
Rehabilitation Act § 504 (prohibiting covered entities from discriminating
against people with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities); see a/,so Lauren
RS. Mendonsa, Note, DualingCausation and the Rights ofEmployees with HIV Under
§504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 13 SCHOLAR 273, 274 (2010). Before protections
for individuals with disabilities found their home in the Rehabilitation Act,
several members of Congress had attempted to "amend titles VI and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include prohibitions of discrimination against"
these individuals. Donald Jay Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:
Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 171, 174 n.19
(1980).
See 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)-(b) (2006); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 626 (1983). Olenick, supra note 12, at 174 & n.17 (noting that
discrimination against people with disabilities in the fields of education,
employment, housing, and law led to their segregation and isolation from the
rest of society).
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benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 14
As first drafted, the Act was concerned primarily with increasing
federal support for vocational rehabilitation, and the definition
of "handicapped individual" reflected this fact, including only
those individuals whose impairment limited their employment
opportunities and who could reasonably be expected to benefit
from vocational rehabilitation. 15 The next year, Congress expanded
its efforts to increase employment opportunities for individuals
with disabilities by proscribing employment discrimination in
the fields of "housing, education and health care." 16 Accordingly,
in 1974, Congress defined the term "handicap" for purposes of
Titles IV and V of the Act to include "[a] ny person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 17

14

15

16

17

Rehabilitation Act§ 504; Arline, 480 U.S. at 277; Consolidated Rai4 465 U.S. at
626 (noting that Congress extended the private rights of action found in "Title
VI of the Civil Rights of 1964 to victims of discrimination in violation of §504 of
the Act") . Congress has expanded the scope of entities subject to Section 504
since the inception of the Act. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 122,
92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing that
disabled individuals shall not be discriminated from "any program or activity
conducted by the Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service")) ;
Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Seroices, and Activities Accessible to All, 14 STA .
L. & PoL'Y REv. 389, 395-96 (2003) (citing Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794(b) (2006))) (noting that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 broadly
expanded the impact of Section 504 to "all of the operations" of an entity if any
part of the entity was receiving federal funds).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 278 n.3. As enacted in 1973, the Act defined "handicap
individual" as "any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap
to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to
titles I and III of this Act. " Rehabilitation Act§ 7 (6) , 87 Stat. at 361.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 291 n.3 (noting that while the original definition of
"handicapped individual" was sufficient for vocational rehabilitation under
Titles I and III of the Act, Congress inserted an additional definition to
provide broader protections in additional fields); Consolidated Rai4 465 U.S.
at 632 (noting that Congress's amendment to Section 504 clearly signaled a
desire to prohibit disc1imination more broadly).
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111 (a) , 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2006)).
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The second and third prongs of this definition further expanded
upon prior protections for people with disabilities by proscribing
discrimination against individuals who may not actually be impaired
at the time of the discrimination. 18 This broad definition was
designed to protect both handicapped individuals and those who
"may at present have no actual incapacity at all" 19 from "archaic
attitudes" and insensitivities based upon misperceptions about
people with disabilities. 20
Although these broader statutory definitions increased the
class of individuals who could qualify as "handicapped" under the
Act, the Act further required that an individual also be "otherwise
qualified" for the position sought in order to fully qualify
for protection under Section 504. 21 A "qualified handicapped
individual" in regards to employment is one who "with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job." 22
Thus an employer potentially has a duty to accommodate an
individual with disabilities. This duty is conditional, though, and
an employer is not required to substantially modify the essential
functions of the job nor bear an "undue financial or administrative
burden" accommodating an individual. 23 Likewise, an employer is
not required to retain or hire an employee who poses a safety or
health risk to others.
Although the Act did not initially contain express language
permitting an employer to make adverse employment decisions
based upon the safety risks an individual presents, the Supreme
Court indicated that the "otherwise qualified individual" provision

18

19
20
21
22
23

Id.; Edna Ruth Vincent, Children with Aids: Protecting Their Rights in the Classroom
Through the Arline Decision and Department of Education Enforcement of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2ADMIN. LJ. 391, 406 (1988).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 405-06 n.6 (1979)).
Id. at 277 & n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974) ).
Rehabilitation Act ofl 973, Pub. L. o. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
Regulations Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 Fed. Reg.
22676, 22678 (May 4, 1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.12) (emphasis added).
C.f Se. Cmty. Collegev. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1978) (providing that, in the
field of postsecondary education, Section 504 does not require an educational
institution to substantially modify a program's standards); see Regulations
Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act at 22,688 (noting that
reasonable accommodations may include restructuring nonessential duties)
(emphasis added).
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provided that option. 24 That is, the question of whether an individual
poses a significant health and safety risk to others is wrapped into the
determination of whether an individual is otherwise qualified for
the position sought. 25 Congress ratified this concept with the 1978
amendments to the Act, which codified a "direct threat" provision
and excluded from coverage those individuals whose use of alcohol
or drugs posed a danger to the safety of others or prevented the
users from performing the duties of their jobs. 26 Importantly, this
exception to the definition of"handicapped individual" was initially
proposed to deny coverage to all individuals addicted to alcohol
or drugs; 27 the enacted version, however, rejected the blanket
exclusion and instead applied narrowly, excluding only those
whose use of alcohol or drugs prevented them from performing
the duties of the job or caused them to pose a "direct threat" to
property or others. 28
•
After Congress enacted this provision, courts began to analyze
whether other types of impairments-not just the limitation
on alcohol or drug abuse-would constitute a "direct threat or
significant risk to thesafetyofothers" and exclude anindividualfrom
coverage. 29 For example, in Strathie v. Department of Transportation,
the plaintiff had a hearing impairment and challenged his denial
of a school bus driver's license, arguing that he was otherwise
qualified for the position. 30 The department of transportation had
a regulation requiring drivers to meet certain hearing standards
without the use of a hearing aid. 31 The court rejected numerous
safety concerns that the defendant presented and defined the

24

25
26

27
28
29

30
31

Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1299 & n .98 (citing Sou theastern Community CoUege
and noting that the initial regulations implementing the Act described an
"othenvise qualified individual" as one who did not pose a "significant risk to
the health and safety of others").
Id. at 1280 & n .99.
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) ).
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n.14 (1986) (citing 124 Cong. Rec. 30322 (1978)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (b) (1978)).
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1299; see ewYork State Ass ' n for Retarded Children
Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the New
York City Board of Education violated Section 504 by discriminating against
children who were carriers of hepatitis B when the Board failed to show that
the children posed a significant risk of transmitting the disease to others) .
716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 230.
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proper inquiry as whether accommodating a driver with a hearing
aid would pose not just some risk but rather an "appreciable risk
to the safety and control of school bus passengers." 32 The court
could not find that the plaintiffs hearing aid use would pose an
appreciable risk such that modifications to accommodate him
would be unreasonable. 33
In Doe v. New York University, a plaintiff, who had been diagnosed
with "Borderline Personality Disorder" and who had a history of
severely violent outbursts and self-destructive conduct, lied about
her emotional health on her medical school application. As a
result, she was expelled from the program. 34 The court considered
whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of a Section
504 claim. 35 The court reviewed expert medical testimony and
concluded that "there [was] a significant risk of recurrence of the
[plaintiff's] self-destructive and harmful conduct." 36 Based upon
the severe harm a recurrence of the plaintiffs episodes might
present and the likelihood of her having another disturbance, the
court found plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits-i.e.,
that she was likely not "otherwise qualified" for admission to the
medical program. 37
This case law expanding the applicability of the direct threat
provision is harmonious with Congress's repudiation of a blanket
exclusion of certain individuals. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida's decision in , as it turns out, was not.
The Arline Decision: Contagious Diseases and the Act

Gene Arline's potentially contagious disease, tuberculosis,
presented another opportunity for a court to consider whether an
impairment was a "handicap" covered under the Act and whether
to expand the safety risk (i.e., direct threat) inquiry further beyond
the scope of alcoholism and drug abuse. Arline argued that her
tuberculosis qualified her as a "handicapped individual" as covered

32

33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 234. The court concluded that the department had not presented
sufficient evidence to support its safety concerns and thus denied the
department's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 232-34.
See id. at 232-34.
666 F.2d 761, 765-66, 778 (1981).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 779 (emphasis added) .
See id. at 777.
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under the Act and that the School Board-as a recipient of federal
funds-violated the Act by terminating her position solely by
reason of her disability, even though she was otherwise qualified
for the position. 38
After a nonjury trial, the district court rendered an unreported,
oral opinion in which it found for the School Board on nearly every
relevant point of contention. First, the court dismissed the notion
that Congress intended contagious diseases to be covered by the Act
and, therefore, found that tuberculosis was not a "handicap" within
the meaning of the Act. 39 While the court acknowledged that Arline
no doubt suffered or had suffered from an unfortunate disability,
the court maintained that the sometimes-infectious disease of
tuberculosis was not a "handicap" within the meaning of the Act. 40
Second, the court noted that even if Arline's contagious disease was
covered under the Act, she was still not an "otherwise qualified"
individual. 41 The court found that she "lacked the qualifications
to teach outside of elementary education." 42 Although the School
Board had a policy that permitted teachers to teach in other fields
while gaining new teaching certifications, the court held that the
School Board was not obligated to offer Arline that option. 43 Finally,
the court acknowledged that Arline might have posed less of a health
and safety risk had she been permitted to teach older students-as
opposed to children in the third grade-but the court nevertheless
determined that the School Board had no obligation to provide
her with an alternative position because of the School Board's
"overriding duty to protect the public from contagious diseases." 44
The record reveals that the district court made no findings of
fact regarding the severity of Arline's tuberculosis, whether she was
in fact contagious at the time of her termination, or the likelihood

38

39
40
41
42
43
44

Arline v. Sch. Bd. , 772 F.2d 759, 760-61 (11th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 273
(1986). The regulations promulgated to aid in effecting the Act define
"otherwise qualified" individual as one "who would be qualified for a specific
job if given 'reasonable accommodation' by the employer." Id. at 760 n.2
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (1)).
Id.
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1986); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note
9, at 5-6.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
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that she would communicate the infection. 45 Further, the court
did not consider whether the School Board could have reasonably
accommodated her. 46 Unlike the courts in Strathie and Doe, which
both considered the severity of the risk and whether the safety
risk posed by the individual was an "appreciable" or a "significant
risk," the court in the instant case did not reach the question of the
nature of the impairment; rather, the court's analysis stopped after
an exercise of statutory interpretation, identifying that Congress
likely did not intend the definition of "handicapped individual" to
cover contagious diseases. 47
Contrary to the holding of district court, on appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals confidently concluded that the statutes,
in "every respect," supported the coverage of contagious diseases
under the Act. 48 Indeed, the court found that the record made clear
that a person afflicted with tuberculosis "has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits ... major life activities, since
the disease can significantly impair respiratory functions." 49 Had
Congress intended to exclude those with contagious diseases from
the protections of the Act, the court reasoned, Congress would have
explicitly excluded them along with abusers of alcohol and drugs. 50
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the
question of whether Arline's contagious disease of tuberculosis
could qualify as a "handicap" under the Act. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, found Arline to be a "handicapped
individual" because of her record ofimpairment. Like the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court drew support for its
conclusion from the Department of Health and Human Services's
regulations implementing the Act. The Court found Arline's
acute tuberculosis to be a physical impairment that affected her
respiratory system, one of the bodily systems mentioned in the
regulations. 51 Second, the Court classified her tuberculosis as

45
46
47
48

49
50
51

Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.

Id.
See id. at 277.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 764 (noting that the Act's coverage of contagious diseases

clearly promoted legislative intent of reducing "unthinking and unnecessary
discrimination").
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §706(7) (B)) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1986) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3U) (2) (i)
(1985)).
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an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.52
To support its conclusion, the Court noted that Arline had been
hospitalized in 1957 during a bout with the disease and explained
that an impairment which requires hospitalization necessarily and
substantially limits at least one major life activity. 53
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, criticized
the majority's holding. 54 Like Judge Moore in the district court,
Justice Rehnquist found that Congress was decidedly silent as to
coverage of individuals with contagious diseases. 55 More important
for Justice Rehnquist, though, was that he would not have declared
such an individual to be "handicapped," because that person poses
a direct threat. 56 This analysis misses the mark.
The majority did not ignore the possibility that a person with a
contagious disease could pose a direct threat and, as a result, would
not be covered under the Act. Instead, Justice Brennan followed
the line of cases from Strathie to Doe and the legislative history, all of
which indicate that such an inquiry is explored when determining
whether the impaired individual is "otherwise qualified" for
the position, not when determining whether one meets the
"handicapped individual" definition.57 The Court noted that "[a]
person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not otherwise be qualified
for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate
that risk." 58 The purpose of reserving that analysis until after the
"handicapped individual" inquiry and not categorically excluding
contagious individuals at the outset-as the district court did-is to
further the aim of the act. That aim was to ensure that employers
make individualized inquiries into the true risks and abilities of
a person so as to avoid decisions based on misconceptions. 59 The
Court acknowledged that "society's accumulated myths and fears

52
53
54
55
56
57

58
59

Id.
Id.; see45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (1985) (mentioning "caring for one's self'' as a
major life activity).
Id. at 292 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 293 (arguing that the majority's "meager proof of congressional intent"
should "not be determinative") .
Id. at 292.
Id. at 285 n.14 (majority opinion) (citing Strathie v. Dept. ofTransp., 716 F.2d
227, 232-34 (3d. Cir. 1983) ; Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 775
(1981)).
Id. at 287 n.16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 284-85.
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about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." 60
Drawing upon the different tests and phrases used by the circuit
courts that had addressed health and safety risks presented by
individuals with disabilities, the Court defined the proper inquiry
for determining whether an individual afflicted with a contagious
disease is otherwise qualified for the position. The Court noted
that this inquiry will normally be an individualized one and that
courts should normally "defer to the reasonable medical judgments
of public health officials" when finding these facts. 61 Courts must
make findings of fact about:
(a) the nature of the risk (how long the disease is
transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the
carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the
potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities
the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm. 62
Studies have shown that people generally fear the unknown and
uncontrollable more so than potential harms that they understand
or believe to be within their control. 63 And even well-meaning
individuals perceive risks askew of true, statistical probabilities. 64
This reliance on imperfect information leads to stereotyping of
people with disabilities and their relative abilities or risks. 65 Cognitive
biases exacerbate the problem: they are largely subconscious and
thus can result in discrimination or altered perceptions "whether

60
61

62
63

64
65

Id. at 284; see Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1302.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Supreme Court drew a comparison between
medical judgments made by private physicians and public health officials but
did not indicate whether a private physician should be accorded the same
validity. Id. at 288 n.18. The Court in Bragdon v. Abbott later indicated that
private health professionals could serve "as objective third-party experts" but
that courts should expect them to rely upon sound scientific evidence in the
profession. Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1280 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 649 (1998)).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1281 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 691-703 (1999));
id. at 1290 & n.49 (collecting studies detailing popular misconceptions ofrisk
based on levels of control).
See id. (citing Lawrence 0. Goslin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study
of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 59, 66 (1999)).
Id. at 1289.
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we intend it or not, whether we know it or not." 66 Thus we can see the
wisdom of the significant threat test articulated by the Supreme
Court, because it attempts to rectify these natural human reactions
and perceptions by requiring a rigorous, fact-specific review of the
health and safety risks one might pose, as determined by sound
and objective medical evidence. Arline's medical condition, on the
other hand, was not subject to this level of review at the district
court, which "made no findings as to the duration and severity"
of her disease nor the risk of transmission or the harm it could
impose. 67 Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings-to determine if Arline was
otherwise qualified for the position; that is, whether she posed a
significant risk to the health and safety of others and, therefore,
could not be reasonably accommodated. 68
Upon remand, Judge Moore of the district court employed
the four-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court to determine
the severity of the risk Arline's tuberculosis posed and, ultimately,
her protection under the Act. After painstakingly analyzing her
tuberculosis, relying on the "reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge" at the time of Arline's termination,
Judge Moore found that the nature of the risk was minimal; 69 the
duration of the risk ended prior to Arline's termination; 70 the risk
66

67

68
69
70

Id. at 1293 (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 4 7
STA . L. REv. 1161 , 1186-1210 (1995)). While the stereotypes and cognitive
biases discussed above are usually unintentional, Congress was well aware
of the more pernicious, intentional discriminatory actions of employers in
furtherance of their own self-interest. Id. at 1296 (noting that some employers
make hiring and termination decisions based upon fears of increased
insurance, increased workers compensation, and negative public reaction);
Olenick, supra note 12, at 173 (noting that employers' often unsubstantiated
fears of higher insurance premiums results in hiring significantly fewer
disabled individuals).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Court raised but did not answer the question as
to whether an individual who was a carrier of a contagious disease such as
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus could be considered
handicapped based solely on the basis of the contagiousness of the disease. Id.
at 282 & n.7.
Id. at 289.
Arline v. School Bd., 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Id. Although Arline tested positive for "cultures," indicating the presence of
the disease, in March and November of 1978, her "smear test"-"the threshold
indicator a person with the tuberculosis germ is capable of communicating
it"-became negative in August of 1977 and never was positive again. Id. at
1288-89, 1291.
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that tuberculosis posed was "not severe"; 71 and that she "posed no
threat of transmitting tuberculosis to the schoolchildren she was
teaching." 72 Based on these findings, the district court held that
Arline was otherwise qualified for the position of a school teacher at
the time she was terminated because she did not pose a significant
threat to the health and safety of others. 73

The Direct Threat Test Takes Hold
The Arline decision provided an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to display the broad protections provided in the
Rehabilitation Act to people with disabilities. In harmony with the
ambitious goals of the Act, the Court developed a direct threat
test, with a mandate for a searching medical review, to "balance[]
the potentially competing interests of individuals with disabilities
and society at large." 74 Arline's direct threat test, which initially was
limited to cases of infectious diseases, has since been codified in
the Rehabilitation Act75 and its newer counterpart, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) .76 Now, courts are using the test to
determine whether one poses a direct threat if one suffers from
various types of potentially threatening disabilities, such as HIV,
attention deficit hyperactive disorder, depression, diabetes, bipolar
disorder, narcolepsy, and epilepsy. 77
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist, similar to Judge Moore of
the district court, found that Congress's silence on the issue of
contagious diseases compelled the "conclusion that contagiousness
is not a handicap within the meaning of § 504," 78 a majority of

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

78

Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
See Deborah Leigh Bender, Echazabal v. Chevron: A Direct Threat to Employers in
the Ninth Circuit, 76 WASH. U. L. REv. 859, 871 (2001).
See supra note 3.
See supra note 4.
See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 648-651 (1998) (HIV); Haas v. Wyoming
Valley Health Care System, 553 F. Supp. 2d 390, 398-99 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing
Robertson v. euromedical Ctr., 161F.3d292, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1998) (attention
deficit hyperactive disorder); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 143-45 (1st
Cir. 1997) (depression); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101F.3d1090, 1094
(5th Cir. 1996) (diabetes); Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 231
(3d Cir. 2000) (epileptics operating potentially dangerous machinery); Ross v.
Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (narcolepsy)).
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1986) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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Supreme Court held that an individual with a contagious disease can
be covered under the Act. 79 Whether one qualifies as an "individual
.with a disability," at least under the ADA, should no longer be as
much of a sticking point. Congress's recent amendments to the
ADA substantially relaxed that classification, furthering goals
similar to those addressed in the Rehabilitation Act and identified
by the Arline Court. 80 As a result of these amendments, courts will
increasingly encounter Arline's direct threat test, and individuals
will more easily bypass the threshold disability question that
temporarily derailed Gene Arline's lawsuit in the district court. 81
Importantly, Arline's direct threat test has not only served both to
protect the rights of people with disabilities and shield employers
from potential liability, it also has fostered a greater understanding
of our society and the people within it.

79
80
81

Id. at 289 (majority opinion).
ADAAmendmentsActof2008, Pub. L. 110-325, §§ 1, 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55
(2008).
See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,009
(Mar. 25, 2011) (citing 2008 House Judiciary Committee Report, at 7) (noting
that "clearing the initial [disability] threshold is critical, as individuals who
are excluded from the definition never have the opportunity to have their
condition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determination made as
to whether they [are] otherwise qualified" (alterations in original) (internal
quotations omitted)).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/16

14

